WhatsApp is currently being investigated over claims employees can read private encrypted chat messages.
Meta is claiming WhatsApp is secure but former contractors say this is not true.
We will explain why we think that WhatsApp is not safe for secure communications and what your best WhatsApp alternatives are.
(Bloomberg) – The former contractors’ claims — that they and some Meta staff had “unfettered” access to WhatsApp messages — were being examined by special agents with the US Department of Commerce, according to the law enforcement records, as well as a person familiar with the matter and one of the contractors. Similar claims were also the subject of a 2024 whistleblower complaint to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, according to the records and the person, who spoke on the condition that they not be identified out of concern for potential retaliation. The investigation and whistleblower complaint haven’t been previously reported.
Continue reading by clicking the article below or jump past for a summary and explanation:
Here is a concise summary of the key findings of the investigation:
1. The Investigation: “Operation Sourced Encryption”
- The Probe: Special agents from the U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security) have been investigating claims that Meta employees can access supposedly encrypted WhatsApp messages.
- Timeline: An internal report from July 2025 described the inquiry as “ongoing,” and sources confirm it remained active as recently as January 2026.
2. The Core Allegations
- “Unfettered” Access: Former contractors from Accenture alleged that Meta personnel had broad, unrestricted access to the content of WhatsApp chats.
- Internal Tools: One contractor claimed that before moderators were granted direct access, the “Facebook team” could simply “pull whatever they wanted” and send it to them.
- Criminal Case Usage: A former moderator stated she confirmed with a Meta employee that they could access encrypted messages for use in criminal investigations.
3. Meta’s Defense
- Technical Denial: Meta spokesperson Andy Stone called the claims “not possible” and “absurd,” maintaining that WhatsApp’s architecture (based on the Signal Protocol) prevents even the company from reading messages.
- Counter-Accusations: Meta described a recent 2026 lawsuit making similar claims as a “frivolous work of fiction” and threatened legal sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
4. Broader Legal & Regulatory Context
- Whistleblower Action: The claims are linked to a 2024 SEC whistleblower complaint and a global class-action lawsuit filed in January 2026 by users in Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa.
- Government Distancing: While the Commerce Department agent conducted these interviews, a spokesperson for the Bureau of Industry and Security later characterized the agent’s findings as “unsubstantiated.”
Summary Table: Claims vs. Reality
| Feature | Meta’s Public Stance | Contractor Allegations |
| Encryption | Default End-to-End (E2EE) | Claims of “internal bypasses” |
| Message Access | “Technically impossible” | “Unfettered access” via internal portals |
| Reporting | Only 5 messages shared if reported | Broad access to historical threads |
| Staff Oversight | No ability to view content | Access granted to US and foreign workers |
Why we think Using WhatsApp is Unsafe for Secure messaging
Firstly, you don’t need to have secrets or be doing something illegal to have a fundamental right to privacy.
The history of Meta has been less than perfect when it comes to privacy and trust. This is usually a bad sign.
WhatsApp has always been a ‘Contacts’ harvesting tool that it shares with its own internal brands like Facebook/Instagram for cross reference lookups and of course this data is clearly used by the key USA government/police agencies for which they are suitably compensated.
But they use the Signal encryption protocol which is secure?
Yes, this is very secure and unbreakable currently but WhatsApp does not publish their code, nor do they allow independent verification of their code. Although messages are ‘end to end encrypted’, Meta could in theory add code to side copy the messages and then receive these over a separate encrypted channel. This could be always ‘on’ or something they can toggle ‘on/off’ when requested by ‘agencies’. The government is very interested in WhatsApp chats (willing to pay a lot) and although Meta has refused EU/UK access, little can be said for USA agencies. For standard world wide police requests for data outside of ‘special access’, will usually provide the following:
IP tracking details, date/time of app usage, full contacts list with meta data, list of who you spoke/messaged to and for how long.
The suspicion now is that they can also read the messages for certain agencies.
Lets assume they actually can’t get copies of the real time messages, how do the government/police get copies?
Many people might find this shocking but the vast majority of WhatsApp users have backup enabled on their phones which in turn copies all their messages to the cloud and this is how literally any agency around the world can gain a copy of literally anything you have ever said on WhatsApp.
WhatsApp added ‘encrypted backups’ as an option which few use but the government has basically insisted they need access. In fact in the UK it is almost impossible to secure your iCloud or Google backup as the UK government has forced the major companies to allow access to cloud level encryption to ensure they can continue to gain access. No backdoor needed on iPhone or Android. The fact there is only a legal TCN against Apple and not Google/Android means they already have this in place – that is for certain but at least Apple is fighting for privacy. Currently it is with 100% certainty that there is government access to all mobile cloud backups in the UK. To avoid this, turn off cloud backup and copy your data to your PC.
What if you trust Meta and you don’t backup to the cloud – are you now in a safe space?
Not at all, firstly if any agency wants your data they have one last resort. Physical access – they can use ‘Cellebrite’ portable devices that can download all the data from your phone without a warrant as you are literally (stopped) walking down the street, at the airport or in your own home. These Cellebrite devices can also unlock the passcode on the fair majority of phones and its really only the latest iOS and iPhones 15+ that are truly safe at this point. But if they can’t get the unlock code, they can legally force you to give it to them and if you refuse, then you will go to prison for 1 to 5 years depending as the will simply claim you are hiding something that is illegal.
Summary Table: Phone Access in the UK (2026)
| Type of Access | Requirement | Legal Basis |
| Physical Phone Search | Officer Authorization (No Warrant) | PACE 1984 |
| Downloading Data (Extraction) | Officer Authorization (No Warrant) | PACE 1984 |
| Call Logs / Metadata | Internal Authorization (No Warrant) | IPA 2016 |
| Live Interception | Warrant Required | IPA 2016 |
| Compelling Passcode | Section 49 Notice Required | RIPA 2000 |
So if it is so insecure, should anyone use it?
Well, yes actually. It is a million times better than direct text/sms messages which are interceptable from everyday hackers running cheap radio hacking kit that allows them to literally steal the messages over the air from anyone in the vicinity (stingray like devices).
Regular messages and direct phone calls are not encrypted in any way – your phone/mobile provider legally logs these along with location data via base station signal information, message metadata and message content. Some data is kept for a few days and other meta data for years. If they want to tag your calls or messages they can easily do this even if its not standard practice as there is no technical limitation nor law against it. Naturally they are easily able to provide this for any investigation. There is also the ability to clone/copy/sim swap a phone number to steal or spoof messages. Literally never make direct phone calls or send regular text messages ever even if you have nothing to hide. So using WhatsApp is still better than these very insecure communication system but overall you would be better off using Signal with no backups as the ultimate in privacy.
The fate of WhatsApp will lie in the results of this investigation, so we will have to wait and see.
1. The Revenue Reality: Built for Harvesting
Meta’s primary business is surveillance advertising. Approximately 97% of its revenue comes from using user data to sell targeted ad space.
- The “Product”: You are not the customer; the advertisers are. For the ads to be valuable, Meta must “harvest” as much information as possible—your location, interests, mood, friendship circles, and purchasing habits.
- The AI Pivot (2025-2026): As of early 2026, Meta has updated its policies to integrate Generative AI more deeply. This includes using interactions with Meta AI in your chats to train their models and refine “hyper-personalized” ads.
2. The Reputational Record: A Trail of Fines
If reputation is measured by legal compliance, Meta has a rocky track record.
- Historical Fines: The $5 billion FTC settlement in 2019 was just the beginning.
- Recent Settlements (2024-2025): In 2024, Meta paid $1.4 billion to the State of Texas to settle a lawsuit over the unauthorized collection of biometric data.
- The EU Battle (2026): After being fined billions by European regulators for their “consent or pay” model, Meta was forced to launch a new “reduced data sharing” option for EU users in January 2026. This allows users to opt for generic ads instead of invasive tracking—a move Meta only made under extreme legal duress.
3. The “Privacy” Paradox
Meta does lead the world in deploying high-end security in some areas, but critics argue this is a defensive move to maintain market share:
- The Good: They brought the Signal Protocol (end-to-end encryption) to billions of people via WhatsApp and recently Messenger. This is a massive win for security but this does not mean they are using it as directed and it is easy to add code to split a copy off that is encrypted for them to read secretly on the side.
- The Bad (Metadata): While they may or may not “read” your message, they know who you talk to, how often, and from where. This “metadata” is often more valuable for profiling than the text of the message itself.
- The “Operation Sourced Encryption” Leak: As highlighted in the 2025 Bloomberg report, whistleblowers allege that internal “backdoors” or reporting features still allow Meta staff to see some content, contradicting their “private” marketing.
Comparison: Reputation vs. Practice
| Category | Meta’s Marketing Claim | The 2026 Reality |
| User Intent | “We care about your privacy.” | Privacy is treated as a legal hurdle to be managed. |
| Data Usage | “We use data to improve your experience.” | Data is the raw material for their multi-billion dollar ad machine. |
| Encryption | “No one can read your messages.” | AI scans “interactions,” and metadata maps your entire life. |
| Integrity | “We are transparent.” | Policy changes are often buried in “fine print” updates. |
What are the WhatsApp alternatives?
In 2026, the security “ceiling” has also been raised by Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)—encryption designed to resist future quantum computers.
2026 Comprehensive Chat Application Security Comparison (Ranked)
| Rank | Platform | Cost (Private) | Post-Quantum (PQC)? | E2EE Text? | IP Masking? | Top 3 User Groups |
| 1 (Audited Secure) | Signal | Free | Yes (PQXDH) | Yes | Yes (Optional) | EU Commission, US Senate, Journalists |
| 2 | SimpleX | Free | Yes (V2 Relays) | Yes | Yes (Proxied) | Privacy Researchers, Tech Ops, OpSec |
| 3 | Session | Free | Yes (LOKI-PQ) | Yes | Yes (Onion) | Whistleblowers, Activists, Reporters |
| 4 | Olvid | Freemium* | Research Stage | Yes | Yes (Relays) | French Govt, Law Firms, Executives |
| 5 | Element | Free** | Beta / Planned | Yes | No (Server Sees) | German Military, NATO, Matrix.org |
| 6 | Jami | Free | Roadmap | Yes | No (Direct P2P) | GNU Project, Developers, DIY Users |
| 7 | Free | Partial Rollout | Yes | No (Meta Sees) | 2B+ Users, Small Biz, Gov. Internal | |
| 8 | Stoat | Free | No | Yes | No | Revolt Communities, Gamers, FOSS |
| 9 | Mumble | Free | No | No (Audio Only) | No | Hardcore Gamers, VoIP Purists, FOSS |
| 10 | TeamSpeak | Paid (Srv) | No | No | No | E-sports Teams, Dev Teams, Gamers |
| 11 | Discord | Free | No | No | No | Gaming, NFT/Crypto, Schools |
*Olvid messaging is free; voice calls require Olvid+ which is not cheap. **Element is free on matrix.org; self-hosting involves hardware/cloud costs.
Detailed Analysis by Your Criteria
1. Why Discord is at the Bottom
- No E2EE for Text: Discord can read every single text message on their platform. They only encrypt voice/video.
- Metadata Goldmine: Discord tracks your IP, device, every game you play, and every server you visit.
- Government Requests: Discord complies with approximately 77% of law enforcement requests for user data.
- Audit: Discord is a “black box” (closed source). Unlike Signal or SimpleX, no one can verify what they do with your data.
2. The “Best” Level of E2EE (Post-Quantum)
- Signal is the gold standard for PQC. Their PQXDH protocol is currently the most mature.
- Session recently upgraded to Session-PQC, securing its onion-routing layer against future threats.
- SimpleX uses a “Double Ratchet” that is mathematically superior for anonymity because it doesn’t use any persistent User IDs.
3. Government & Police Disclosures
- The “Zero Knowledge” Tier (Signal, SimpleX, Session, Olvid): They have no data to give. If the police raid their offices, they find nothing because there are no central user databases or IDs.
- The “Metadata” Tier (WhatsApp[pending], Element): They can’t read messages, but they can tell the police who you talked to and when.
- The “Plain Text” Tier (Discord, Teamspeak): If served with a warrant, they can hand over your actual chat history.
4. The 2026 Audit Status
- Signal: Open source and audited annually by firms like NCC Group. (This the most important requirement)
- SimpleX: Audited by Trail of Bits (2024/2025).
- Olvid: The only one with a Security Certificate from ANSSI (French National Cyber Agency).
- Discord: No independent security audit has ever been made public regarding their data handling.
Summary Recommendation
- For High-Risk Security: Use Signal or SimpleX.
- For Absolute Anonymity (Hide IP/Identity): Use Session.
- For Sovereignty (Your own server): Use Element (Matrix).
- For Casual Socializing (Zero Privacy): Use Discord.
Lets look at the top contenders in more detail
While all four of these apps use high-end encryption, they solve the “metadata problem” in fundamentally different ways.
2026 Deep Comparison Matrix
| Feature | Signal | SimpleX Chat | Session | Element (Matrix) |
| Primary ID | Phone Number* | None (No IDs) | Session ID | Username/Email |
| Architecture | Centralized | Decentralized (Relays) | Decentralized (Onion) | Federated |
| Metadata Protection | High (Sealed Sender) | Extreme (No ID) | Extreme (Onion) | Variable (Medium) |
| PQC (Post-Quantum) | Yes (PQXDH) | In Progress | Yes (Session-PQC) | Beta/Planned |
| Self-Hostable? | No | Yes (Relays) | No (Node Network) | Yes (Full Server) |
| Multi-Device? | Yes (Linked) | Yes | Yes (Seed Phrase) | Yes (Excellent) |
*Signal now allows you to hide your phone number behind a username (you never need to give your number to anyone), but a number is still required for the back-end registration initially. But the Signal app does hash the number, using only a portion of the hash which makes it a lot safer and they have a host of other privacy protections to keep contact numbers truly secure.
1. Signal: The “Reliable Standard”
Signal remains the benchmark for most users. Its primary goal is to make high-end security so easy that your parents can use it.
- Security: It uses the Signal Protocol, which has been upgraded to PQXDH (Post-Quantum Extended Diffie-Hellman) to protect against future quantum computers.
- The Metadata Catch: Signal is centralized. While they use “Sealed Sender” to hide who is talking to whom from their own servers, they still have a central directory of users.
- Best For: Everyday use, families, and replacing WhatsApp/iMessage without a learning curve.
2. SimpleX Chat: The “Ghost Protocol”
SimpleX is the only messenger that has no user identifiers. You don’t have a username, a phone number, or even a random string of numbers that stays with you forever.
- Security: Instead of a “user account,” SimpleX creates unique “queues” for every single person you talk to. To a server, these look like random, unrelated streams of data.
- Anonymity: It is the hardest app on this list to “map.” Even if a server is compromised, there is no list of “contacts” to find.
- Best For: High-stakes anonymity, one-time secure connections, and users who want zero digital footprint.
3. Session: The “Anonymity King”
Session is a fork of Signal that removes the phone number and adds Onion Routing (the same technology used by the Tor browser).
- Security: It recently regained Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and added Post-Quantum encryption in late 2025.
- The Network: Your messages bounce through three different “Service Nodes” around the world before reaching the recipient. This masks your IP address, so not even the network knows where you are physically located.
- Best For: Whistleblowers, activists, and anyone in a country with heavy internet surveillance or “IP logging” laws.
4. Element (Matrix): The “Sovereign Fortress”
Element is built on the Matrix protocol. It is less of a “chat app” and more of a “communication infrastructure.”
- Security: It uses the Olm and Megolm ratchets. While secure, its primary strength is Data Sovereignty.
- Federation: You can host your own “Homeserver” (like your own private email server). You own the database, the keys, and the hardware.
- The Weakness: If you use a public server (like matrix.org), your metadata is more exposed than on Signal or SimpleX because the server tracks your “presence” and room memberships.
- Best For: Teams, large communities, and people who want to own their own “Social Media” infrastructure.
Here is the breakdown of what it’s like to actually use them on your phone and how they sound during a call.
1. Signal: The Gold Standard
Signal is the only app on this list that feels like a 1:1 replacement for WhatsApp or iMessage.
- The App: It is incredibly smooth. It supports high-quality “Stories,” animated stickers, and a very fast camera interface. The UI is clean, and the “Sealed Sender” technology works invisibly in the background.+2
- Voice Quality: Crystal Clear. Signal uses a proprietary “adaptive jitter buffer” and the Opus audio codec. Even on a weak 3G or throttled connection, the audio remains stable. It sounds better than a standard cellular call.
- Reliability: High. Notifications almost never fail, and it handles the transition between Wi-Fi and 5G seamlessly.
2. SimpleX Chat: The “Privacy-First” Innovator
SimpleX has improved massively in 2026, but it still has a “technical” feel compared to Signal.
- The App: The UI is functional but “flat.” It lacks the “bubbly” feel of consumer apps. A unique feature is the Incognito Mode for every contact—you can have a different name and avatar for every person you talk to.
- Voice Quality: Good to Great. SimpleX calls are peer-to-peer by default. If both users have good internet, the quality is indistinguishable from Signal. However, because it doesn’t have the same massive server infrastructure as Signal, calls can occasionally take 2-3 seconds longer to “handshake” and connect.
- Reliability: It can be “chatty” with notifications. Because there is no central server, your phone has to stay awake to receive messages, which can slightly increase battery drain.
3. Session: The “Onion-Routed” Work in Progress
Session’s biggest hurdle is its decentralized nature, which makes “real-time” features difficult.
- The App: Very slick and modern looking. It feels “heavy” because it’s constantly routing data through three different nodes. It has a beautiful dark mode and simple navigation.
- Voice Quality: Average/Variable. Because your voice data is being bounced around the globe (Onion Routing) to hide your IP address, you will experience latency (a half-second delay). It feels like a long-distance satellite call. In early 2026, voice calls are still considered “Beta” by many users due to frequent “ghost rings” where the phone doesn’t ring on the other end.
- Reliability: Lower. Messages can occasionally take a few seconds to “tick” as sent.
4. Element (Matrix): The “Desktop-Power” on Mobile
You should use the Element X app (the 2026 “NextGen” version) rather than the “Classic” Element app.
- The App: Element X is lightning fast. It uses “sliding sync,” meaning large chat histories load instantly. It feels like a professional tool (similar to Slack). It is the best for managing 100+ different “Rooms” or “Spaces.”
- Voice Quality: Solid. Element now uses MatrixRTC, which provides very high-quality E2EE group calls. It handles large-scale video conferencing much better than SimpleX or Session.
- Reliability: High, provided you are on a well-maintained “Homeserver.” If you use the free
matrix.orgserver, it can occasionally lag during peak hours.
Quick Verdict: Voice & UX
| App | UI Polish | Voice Quality | Latency (Lag) | Best For… |
| Signal | 10/10 | 10/10 | None | Daily calls with family. |
| SimpleX | 7/10 | 8/10 | Very Low | Ultra-private 1-on-1s. |
| Session | 8/10 | 5/10 | High | Staying anonymous (text-first). |
| Element X | 9/10 | 8/10 | Low | Professional/Group meetings. |
In summary:
Use Signal or SimpleX if you want the most secure system that is ready to go or if you want to self host try Element X.
The jury is still out on WhatsApp but overall it can’t really be trusted fully no matter what happens and you sure don’t want backup enabled.
